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despite their compelling logic, index insurance contracts that transfer risk from smallholder farmers and pastoralists have 
met with sometimes indifferent demand and low uptake by the 
intended beneficiaries. Yet the evidence that risk plays an important 
role in creating and perpetuating rural poverty is mounting and 
demands further efforts to solve this problem. This brief focuses on 
ways to solve this demand problem by designing index insurance 
contracts more intelligently.  
elements of an index insurance contract
An index insurance contract has four elements:
1. a signal with a knowable probability distribution that is related to 
the assets or income that the contract is meant to insure (rainfall 
levels or average crop yields in a locality are possible signals);
2. a mapping system that connects the signal to an index whose 
value will determine indemnity payments under the contract;
3. a payoff structure that defines the relationship between the 
index and indemnity payments; and,
4. basis risk, which is the risk that an index will not perfectly cover 
all the losses that any particular individual might experience.
Identifying an acceptable signal (such as rainfall) should be 
just the first stage in designing an index insurance contract. Too 
often, however, an untransformed signal is converted into a simple 
linear insurance index. Predictably, such contracts poorly cover the 
actual risks and losses faced by small-scale farmers and pastoralists. 
A poorly designed contract, or one that is disconnected from the 
losses faced by the putatively insured, can actually reduce average 
farmer income and increase its variance. The challenge is to more 
intelligently design contracts from a demand-side perspective so 
that the index contract offers the best coverage possible for the 
insured party.
design contracts using livelihood data
The first step in designing a demand-driven contract is to see if a 
weather or other signal can be used to predict the individual losses 
that the contract is designed to insure. For example, designers of 
an index-based livestock insurance contract for northern Kenyan 
pastoral households used a range of statistical regression techniques 
to analyze household and local-level data. They found that a 
rangeland groundcover signal best explained individual losses of 
livelihood. This kind of statistical analysis is the best way to ground 
truth a contract and assure that it provides the best insurance 
protection possible (that is, it minimizes uncovered basis risk), 
enhancing the demand-worthiness of the contract.  
In addition, regression analysis translates a signal, which 
may be measured in exotic units unfamiliar to farmers, into the 
livelihood units that make sense to them. In the northern Kenya 
example, regression analysis translated readings from an infrared 
spectrometer into a measure of predicted herd mortality, something 
already well understood by pastoralists.
choose index signal using demand-side 
considerations
Many signals besides weather are available for index contracts. 
Index insurance should rely on the signal (or signals) that offer the 
best contract from a demand-side perspective. Livelihood data can 
be used to design the best contract for each possible signal. The 
contracts, or hybrid combinations of them, can then be compared 
to see which one offers the best value to the beneficiary population, 
taking into account the predictive power of the signal as well as the 
cost of obtaining it.  
Among index insurance contracts for West African grain 
farmers, the most promising contract proved to be one based on the 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index, or NDVI—a remotely sensed, 
satellite-based measure of vegetation density. Every 10 days NDVI 
is measured and provided freely at a resolution of 8 kilometers by 
8 kilometers (km)—equivalent to having a separate weather station 
or an area yield survey for each 8-km square. The values for the 
NDVI were compared with average village grain yields and rainfall. 
The three measures moved in tandem, but careful analysis showed 
that the power of the NDVI to predict individual household grain 
production was equivalent to an area yield contract implemented at 
a village level and was superior to the village rainfall gauge. Given 
that village-level area yield contracts would be extremely costly to 
implement (requiring an annual yield survey for every village where 
an insured farmer lives), the NDVI signal is the preferred basis for an 
area yield contract in this context. 
This result should not be generalized. A design analysis 
for cotton farmers in Mali showed that NDVI was inferior in its 
predictive power to a district area yield index that is freely available 
from the cotton parastatal. What is generalizable is the need to test 
the predictive power of candidate insurance indexes against actual 
livelihood data.
indemnity structures that mediate between 
contract price and trustworthiness
The indemnity structure of an index contract defines the payoffs 
that accrue to farmers based on the realized value of the index. This 
indemnity structure needs to be designed to protect the insured 
against the catastrophic losses that create and sustain poverty, but 
too generous a payout structure results in an unaffordable contract.  
Often these two considerations result in a payoff structure 
like that illustrated by the tiny dashed line in Figure 1. Taken 
from an actual index insurance product for cotton farmers in 
Peru, this indemnity structure begins to pay off when yields fall 
below 32 quintals per hectare and protects the farmer against the 
catastrophic risk of default and land loss. But this contract would 
be expected to pay off at most one to two times every 10 years. 
Adoption of this product would require significant trust on the part 
of farmers, who would on average have to pay premiums for quite a 
few years before seeing the payoffs that would generate confidence 
in the trustworthiness of the contract.
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One response to this trust problem would 
simply be to raise the ”strike point,” or payoff 
point, to, say, a yield of 36 quintals per hectare. 
This contract would pay off much more 
frequently, but its price would be unaffordably 
high—more than double that of the low-strike-
point contract. A solution to this trade-off 
between price and trustworthiness is a 
nonlinear payoff structure (shown by the solid 
line in Figure 1). Indemnity payments begin at 
a high strike point to induce confidence, but 
to keep the price down, these initial, trust-
inducing payments are low. As the yield index 
falls further, the rate of payment increases so 
that the catastrophic protection is the same 
as the original, low-price contract. The cost of 
this nonlinear, hybrid contract is about US$5 
more per hectare. The contract need appear 
no more or less complex to the farmer than a 
conventional linear contract.
effective education for the never-
before insured
No matter how well designed, index insurance 
can reduce risk only if there is sustained and 
informed demand for it. Effective demand for 
insurance may be weak, however, among a 
population never before insured. Insurance is an intangible good that 
offers stochastic benefits: sometimes insurance delivers an indemnity 
payment and sometimes it does not. If farmers misunderstand or 
underestimate the value of a well-designed insurance contract, 
there will be little demand for the contract and little impact on 
farmer behavior. Conversely, if farmers overestimate the value of the 
insurance (especially index insurance, which offers only incomplete 
coverage of losses), then they are likely to be disappointed by the 
insurance and fail to continue to purchase it over time. Thus, without 
training for potential buyers in financial literacy, it is unlikely that 
index insurance contracts will solve the problem of agricultural risk.  
Recent advances in teaching financial literacy to populations 
with modest formal education include comic book–like educational 
materials. For index insurance in particular, simulation games have 
been designed to allow farmers to experiment with the actual 
contract they will have an opportunity to purchase. Although much 
remains to be learned about how to create the knowledge needed to 
underwrite demand for these products, initial experience with these 
games in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Peru is promising. 
More generally, insurance providers are still in the early stages 
of learning how best to design and deliver index insurance. There will 
surely be additional errors in contractual design and implementation, 
but the time for additional thought and work is now.   n
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Standard contract, low 
strike (cheap, infrequent payoffs)
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Figure 1—dual strike-point contract
Source: Author’s calculations.
